naissances continued to be made almost daily towards Arundel.
Meanwhile General French's sphere of command had been increased by the
addition to it of the central line of communication down to Port
Elizabeth, volunteer corps, including the Prince Alfred's Guards, of a
strength of 900 all ranks, being placed at his disposal. Some
difficulty, however, arising as to the movement of these colonial
troops north of Cradock, detachments of regulars were sent temporarily
from Naauwpoort to hold Rosmead Junction and the railway bridges near
it against small rebel parties, which were reported to be under arms
in that neighbourhood. The force at Naauwpoort was gradually augmented
by the arrival of the 12th Lancers on the 25th, and O. battery R.H.A.,
and another ammunition column on the 27th. On the other hand, by the
1st December the whole battalion of the Black Watch had been, at the
urgent request of Major-General Wauchope, returned to Orange River to
replace infantry sent forward to Lord Methuen. The 1st Suffolk
regiment arrived at Naauwpoort that afternoon, and on the 2nd December
the New Zealand Mounted Rifles, a fine corps 400 strong, and the 26th
company R.E., joined General French.

[Sidenote: Nov. 26th to Dec. 7th. The "policy of worry."]

[Sidenote: Arundel occupied, Dec. 7th.]

On the 26th November Sir R. Buller had telegraphed to Sir F.
Forestier-Walker: "French should attack Arundel as soon as he feels
strong enough, but not before, and he should be sure that he is strong
enough. We can now afford to wait;" and on the following day he added:
"Tell French to maintain an active defence, not running any risk." On
the 30th another despatch from the General Commanding-in-Chief to
General Forestier-Walker ran: "suggest to French that a policy of
worry, without risking men, might have a good effect on the enemy at
Colesberg and keep him occupied." Meanwhile the constant appearance of
patrols from Naauwpoort had not only completely chained to the
vicinity of Colesberg the main body of the enemy, but had made him
nervous for the safety of his advance party on the kopjes north of
Arundel station; and on the 29th November a squadron of the 12th
Lancers discovered that those kopjes had been evacuated. On this, two
days later, two squadrons of that regiment were sent forward to
Arundel station to bivouac there that night with a view to a
reconnaissance being pushed on to Colesberg on the following morning.
But at 10 p.m. the Li