where they skirmished at long range on the 22nd
and 23rd with the force which, under Major-General Barton, had
recently been concentrated at that station. Some scouts of this
detachment even pushed on as far as Nottingham Road. The remainder of
the Commandant-General's column moved eastward, seized the railway
between the Highlands and Willow Grange, and joined hands with David
Joubert's commando, which since the 19th had remained halted at Warley
Common, a farm three or four miles to the east of Highlands station.

[Sidenote: Situation. Night of Nov. 22nd.]

The situation, therefore, on the night of the 22nd was remarkable. The
British collected at Estcourt, whither General Hildyard had been sent
on the 15th to take command, now amounted to 800 mounted troops
(including Bethune's newly-raised battalion), one battery of R.F.A.,
the Natal Field battery, two naval 12-prs., and 4,400 infantry.
Major-General Barton, who had reached Mooi River on the 18th, had, by
the night of the 22nd, under his orders Thorneycroft's mounted
infantry (490 strong), a battery and two sections of R.F.A., and about
4,000 infantry. Estcourt and Mooi River stations are 23 miles apart.
Although, therefore, the Boers had cut the railway and telegraphic
communication between the two stations, yet the situation of Gen.
Joubert (halted between two British forces, each equal in strength to
the two Boer commandos), was audacious, if not dangerous. Moreover, in
rear of Mooi River, further British reinforcements were disembarking
at Durban, and being pushed up to the front in a continuous stream.
The composition and exact distribution of the troops actually in
southern Natal on the 23rd November is given in Appendix 8. The
pendulum had thus swung completely over. The armoured train incident
was of no importance either tactically or strategically, and that
momentary success was the only one achieved by Joubert. The slow and
hesitating movements of the Boer columns had but hastened the
disembarkation and concentration of the troops destined for the relief
of Ladysmith. Finally, a tardy fit of rashness had induced the old
Commandant-General to place his burghers in peril.

[Sidenote: Exaggerated estimate of Boer strength causes hesitating
British action.]

The danger of Joubert's situation was not fully realised by the
British staff. The strength of the enemy's invading columns had been
magnified by rumour to 7,000, and the number of their guns doubled.