e other ranks
dead and an unwounded prisoner, while our casualties were practically
nil.

The objective allotted to the Division for the 25th September was the
ground between the north end of Morval (attacked by 5th Division)
and the road which passes through the centre of Lesboeufs. At 12.35
p.m. the attack was launched--the 16th Infantry Brigade on the right
gaining the first objective with the Buffs, and the final objective
with K.S.L.I. and the Y. and L. On the left the 2nd D.L.I. and the
Essex captured the first objective, and the West Yorks and two
companies 14th D.L.I. the final objective. This was one of the most
successful battles on the Somme--thanks to good weather and
observation, a carefully arranged creeping barrage, and a sound
preliminary bombardment.

The Division captured over 500 prisoners, 6 machine-guns, and 4 heavy
trench-mortars. Tanks were not used. We here turned the tables on the
52nd Division, 26th Reserve Corps, our old opponents at Ypres, where
the ground was all in their favour and where they had proved
troublesome antagonists.

After consolidating its ground the Division was relieved by the 20th
Division on 30th September, and the long struggle began for the
possession of the high ground overlooking the Bapaume-Le Transloy
Road.

On 7th October the XIV Corps (20th and 56th Divisions) attacked
with only partial success, and the 6th Division was brought in
again on night 8/9th October for a general attack on the 12th
October. The enemy had dug a series of trenches named by us
Rainbow--Cloudy--Misty--Zenith, etc., a portion of which had been
captured by us, making a somewhat pronounced salient. All three
brigades were in the line, with one battalion in front trenches, the
71st Infantry Brigade (Brig.-Gen. E. Feetham) being in the salient,
with the 16th Infantry Brigade on the right and the 18th Infantry
Brigade on the left. The objective of the attack of the 12th October
was the line of trenches running north from Le Transloy.

At 2.5 p.m. the flank brigades attacked, but with only partial
success. The failure to make ground, which was general all along
the British front, was attributed to want of surprise, as we had
bombarded the position for two days, and always attacked in the early
afternoon. Further, the ground was very heavy and observation
extremely bad. The Germans were fresh troops, and fought well. Perhaps
more than anything it was due to the effect of their machine-gun fire