The depth from front or outpost zone to reserve or
battle zone was about 2,000 yards. With only three battalions in a
brigade, there was no option but to assign one battalion in each
brigade to the defence of the outpost zones, and keep two battalions
in depth in the battle zone. With battalions at just over
half-strength, and with the undulating nature of the ground, the
defence resolved itself everywhere into a succession of posts with a
very limited field of fire.

A good corps line called the Vaux-Morchies Line had been dug, the
nearest portion a mile behind the reserve line, and this was held by
the Pioneers and R.E., owing to scarcity of numbers.

The Right Group, R.F.A. (Lt.-Col. H. Weber), consisting of 2nd Brigade
(less 21st Battery), supported the 18th Infantry Brigade; the Left
Group (Lt.-Col. J. A. C. Forsyth), consisting of 24th Brigade, 21st
Battery, and 93rd (Army) Brigade, supported the 16th and 17th Infantry
Brigades.

Reports from deserters that we were to be heavily attacked were
persistent, and the Division stood to arms twice before 21st March. On
20th March aeroplane photos disclosed ammunition pits for seventy
extra batteries opposite the divisional front, and when at 5 a.m. on
21st March the bombardment commenced, there was no doubt but that a
real offensive had begun. Warning had been given overnight for all
troops to be in battle positions by 5 a.m., but it came too late to
stop working parties, and the reserve battalions of all brigades had
marched ten miles before the battle commenced.

Fog favoured the Germans in that it prevented us seeing when the
attack was launched, but every credit must be given them for the skill
they evinced and the dash with which they pushed forward and brought
up successive waves of attackers. By concentrating their efforts on
the three main valleys, i.e. Noreuil Valley on our extreme left,
Lagnicourt Valley in the centre and Morchies Valley on our extreme
right, they avoided much of the fire which they would have encountered
on the broad spurs, and thus worked round and isolated the garrisons
of the latter. For five hours the bombardment continued with
tremendous force, first with gas and H.E. on back areas to cut
communications and disorganize reinforcements, later about 7 to 8 a.m.
with smoke and H.E. on the forward system. The intensity of it may be
gauged by the fact that four out of five concealed anti-tank guns were
knocked out by direct hits.

This b