relieved it on night 13/14th
September, with the 1st Division on the left and the 34th (French)
Division on the right.

It was expected that the enemy would stand on the heights which
command St. Quentin to the west and south, but it was not known
whether their resistance would be strong or not, as they were much
disorganized.

The 1st and 6th Divisions, hand in hand with the French, were ordered
to capture this tactical line on 18th September, as a starting-point
for the attack on the Hindenburg Line, which ran just outside St.
Quentin to the canal at Bellenglise.

To the 18th Infantry Brigade was entrusted the task of securing a line
well clear of Holnon Wood for the forming-up line on the 18th, and in
doing so it first had to clear the wood and establish posts at the
edge, then push forward. The selected forming-up line included to us
Holnon Village on the right and next to the French.

On the morning of the 16th September the 11th Essex, after an
unsuccessful attempt to push forward during the night, attacked under
a barrage and advanced from the line of posts taken over a little way
inside the wood to a line of trenches just clear of the wood,
capturing in this small operation forty-six prisoners. It was now
arranged for the 1st, 6th and 34th (French) Divisions to advance
simultaneously to secure the above-mentioned starting line. On the
left the 1st Division was successful, and so were the 11th Essex, who,
held up at first by heavy shelling and machine-gun fire, persevered
throughout the day and were rewarded by finishing up in possession of
the whole of their objectives, a very creditable performance.

On the right the West Yorks had to secure Holnon Village, which lay in
a hollow commanded by Round and Manchester Hills in the area allotted
to the French, and which was itself strongly held. The French failed
in their attack, and though the West Yorks obtained part of the
village they could not clear it and establish the starting line
beyond it. The situation at the end of the 17th was therefore
unsatisfactory on the right, but it was impossible to put off the
general attack, and arrangements had to be improvised. Another
unsatisfactory feature was that Holnon Wood covered practically the
whole 2,500 yards frontage of the Division, and was so drenched with
gas shells and the tracks so bad, that both 16th and 71st Infantry
Brigades had to make a detour north and south of the wood respectively
to reach their