mules, the best single mule, and the best light draught horse.

CHAPTER VIII

CAMBRAI

1917

The general situation on the British Western Front in November 1917,
though fairly universally known to-day, may now be outlined, and the
hopes and aims which led to the Cambrai offensive be touched on
shortly. The prolonged and hard-fought attacks in Flanders by the
British, and in other portions of the front by the French, had caused
the enemy to concentrate his forces in the threatened sectors,
denuding those portions of the line which appeared reasonably safe and
quiet. The Cambrai sector was included among the latter, for not only
was the ground very open, forbidding to us the unseen concentration of
the large forces and masses of heavy artillery which at that period
were deemed essential, but also the Hindenburg Line was immensely
strong and the trenches so wide that the tanks in use by us could not
cross them.

This enemy sector was, therefore, particularly suitable for surprise
by us, as it was deemed by the enemy to be unassailable.

The Hindenburg Line ran north-west for six miles from the St. Quentin
Canal at Banteux to Havrincourt on the Canal du Nord, where it bent
sharply north for four miles to Moeuvres, thus making a pronounced
salient. The Commander-in-Chief's plan was to smash the salient, to
occupy the high ground overlooking Cambrai--notably the Bourlon Wood
Ridge--push cavalry through the gap in order to disorganise
communications and the arrival of reinforcements, and to roll up the
enemy's defences to the north-west.

The French held considerable forces in the immediate vicinity
to exploit successes. It was reckoned that the enemy could not
reinforce his front under forty-eight hours. Everything depended in
the first instance on successful surprise, and in the second on
securing within forty-eight hours the important tactical points within
the salient. The difficulties of surprise, which were many and
serious, were most successfully overcome, but the enterprise failed
eventually because the key points were not seized.

The principal factors operating against success were the limited hours
of daylight and the long distances to be traversed both by men and by
tanks, which, though vastly improved since 1916, were still very slow.
There was also, in the case of securing the high ground west of
Cambrai, the canal to be crossed by tanks. While smashing in the
enemy's salient we ourselves were