hten the line preparatory to a general attack on the 15th
September.

On 12th September attacks by the 56th Division on the south and the
Guards on the north reduced the neck of the horseshoe, or pocket, to
about 500 yards, but could not close it. The situation within the
horseshoe was undefined, and the exact positions of the Quadrilateral
and other trenches were not known, owing to the bad flying weather.
Even our own positions were in doubt, as almost every vestige of
roads, railways and even villages had disappeared under the continuous
bombardments.

On night 11/12th September the 71st Infantry Brigade (Brig.-Gen. J. F.
Edwards) relieved part of the Guards Division and the 16th Infantry
Brigade (Brig.-Gen. W. L. Osborn), part of the 56th Division, with
orders on the 13th September to straighten the line by capturing the
Quadrilateral. The 71st Infantry Brigade attacked with the Foresters
north of the railway and 9th Suffolk Regiment south of the railway,
while the 8th Bedford Regiment, who were close to the Quadrilateral on
the north-east of the Leuze Wood, co-operated by bombing up the trench
towards it. The artillery co-operation was weak, observation being
difficult, and though the troops advanced with the greatest gallantry
the northern attack could only make 500 yards, and the southern attack
of the 71st Infantry Brigade still less, while casualties from the
enemy artillery and machine-gun fire were very large.

A second attack at 6 p.m. the same day succeeded in bringing our line
to about 250 yards from the Strong Point, and in getting touch on the
right with the 16th Infantry Brigade.

Preparations were now made to include the Quadrilateral in the
general attack of the 15th September instead of making it a subsidiary
operation--a situation which recurred two years later almost to a day
in the attack on Holnon Village, and which had similar results.

The British objective for the 15th September was
Gueudecourt-Flers-Lesboeufs-Morval--the XIV Corps (Guards and 6th
Division) to capture the two latter. It was the first occasion on
which tanks were employed, and as far as the Division was concerned
was a failure, for of the three allotted to the 6th Division two broke
down before starting, and the third, moving off in accordance with
orders long before the infantry, had its periscope shot off, its
peep-holes blinded, was riddled by armour-piercing bullets, and had to
come back without achieving anything. Th