d at the same point of view, and
consequently to be guilty of a contradiction. Such is, however, not the
case; he made no such concession of love of God and one's neighbour in his
letter. If he therefore insists that there is no distinction between good
and evil, I cannot at least refute him out of his own mouth. The only
place where he is inconsistent is where he concedes that he could not
strike a dog, but is filled with bloodthirstiness toward the Jewish idea
of God. Here he clearly holds it good that he cannot be cruel to an
animal, and that he looks upon bloodthirstiness as a contrast. He also
concedes that a lie can never accomplish any good, and believes that the
truth is beautiful and holy. If a lie can accomplish no good, only evil,
then there must be a distinction between good and evil. And what is the
meaning of beautiful and holy, if there is no contrast between good and
evil. But I shall argue this point no farther, but simply say _peccavi_,
and I believe that he, and those like-minded with him, will be satisfied
with that. How different it would have been, however, had I been guilty of
such a mistake in a personal dispute! The injured party would never have
believed that my oversight was accidental, and not malicious, in spite of
the fact that it would have been the most stupid malevolence to say that
which every one who can read would instantly recognise as untrue. But
enough of this, and enough to show that my Horseherd at least remained
consistent. Even when he so far forgets himself as to say, "God be
praised," he excuses himself. Only he has unfortunately not told us what
he really means when he says that good and evil are identical. Good and
evil are relative ideas, just like right and left, black and white, and
although he has told us that he turned somersaults with joy over the
discovery that this distinction is false, he has left us in total darkness
as to how we shall conceive this identity.

But let us turn back to more important things. My opponents further call
me sharply to account, and ask how I can imagine that the material world
can be rational, or permeated with reason. I believed that it must be
clear to every person with a philosophical training, that there are things
that are beyond our understanding, that man can neither sensibly apprehend
nor logically conceive an actual beginning, and that to inquire for the
beginning of the subjective self, or of the objective world, is like
inqui