xical and makes nonsense of all scientific
phraseology. The case is even worse if we admit the relativity of time.
For the same arguments apply, and break up time into the dream time and
causal time which belong to different orders of reality.

I have however been discussing an extreme form of the bifurcation
theory. It is, as I think, the most defensible form. But its very
definiteness makes it the more evidently obnoxious to criticism. The
intermediate form allows that the nature we are discussing is always the
nature directly known, and so far it rejects the bifurcation theory. But
it holds that there are psychic additions to nature as thus known, and
that these additions are in no proper sense part of nature. For example,
we perceive the red billiard ball at its proper time, in its proper
place, with its proper motion, with its proper hardness, and with its
proper inertia. But its redness and its warmth, and the sound of the
click as a cannon is made off it are psychic additions, namely,
secondary qualities which are only the mind's way of perceiving nature.
This is not only the vaguely prevalent theory, but is, I believe, the
historical form of the bifurcation theory in so far as it is derived
from philosophy. I shall call it the theory of psychic additions.

This theory of psychic additions is a sound common-sense theory which
lays immense stress on the obvious reality of time, space, solidity and
inertia, but distrusts the minor artistic additions of colour, warmth
and sound.

The theory is the outcome of common-sense in retreat. It arose in an
epoch when the transmission theories of science were being elaborated.
For example, colour is the result of a transmission from the material
object to the perceiver's eye; and what is thus transmitted is not
colour. Thus colour is not part of the reality of the material object.
Similarly for the same reason sounds evaporate from nature. Also warmth
is due to the transfer of something which is not temperature. Thus we
are left with spatio-temporal positions, and what I may term the
'pushiness' of the body. This lands us to eighteenth and nineteenth
century materialism, namely, the belief that what is real in nature is
matter, in time and in space and with inertia.

Evidently a distinction in quality has been presupposed separating off
some perceptions due to touch from other perceptions. These
touch-perceptions are perceptions of the real inertia, whereas the other
perc