posited for us a general fact: namely,
something is going on; there is an occurrence for definition.
This general fact at once yields for our apprehension two factors, which
I will name, the 'discerned' and the 'discernible.' The discerned is
comprised of those elements of the general fact which are discriminated
with their own individual peculiarities. It is the field directly
perceived. But the entities of this field have relations to other
entities which are not particularly discriminated in this individual
way. These other entities are known merely as the relata in relation to
the entities of the discerned field. Such an entity is merely a
'something' which has such-and-such definite relations to some definite
entity or entities in the discerned field. As being thus related, they
are--owing to the particular character of these relations--known as
elements of the general fact which is going on. But we are not aware of
them except as entities fulfilling the functions of relata in these
relations.
Thus the complete general fact, posited as occurring, comprises both
sets of entities, namely the entities perceived in their own
individuality and other entities merely apprehended as relata without
further definition. This complete general fact is the discernible and it
comprises the discerned. The discernible is all nature as disclosed in
that sense-awareness, and extends beyond and comprises all of nature as
actually discriminated or discerned in that sense-awareness. The
discerning or discrimination of nature is a peculiar awareness of
special factors in nature in respect to their peculiar characters. But
the factors in nature of which we have this peculiar sense-awareness are
known as not comprising all the factors which together form the whole
complex of related entities within the general fact there for
discernment. This peculiarity of knowledge is what I call its
unexhaustive character. This character may be metaphorically described
by the statement that nature as perceived always has a ragged edge. For
example, there is a world beyond the room to which our sight is confined
known to us as completing the space-relations of the entities discerned
within the room. The junction of the interior world of the room with the
exterior world beyond is never sharp. Sounds and subtler factors
disclosed in sense-awareness float in from the outside. Every type of
sense has its own set of discriminated entities which are known t
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