se-perception, it is not concerned with the sense-awareness itself.
I repeat the main line of this argument, and expand it in certain
directions.
Thought about nature is different from the sense-perception of nature.
Hence the fact of sense-perception has an ingredient or factor which is
not thought. I call this ingredient sense-awareness. It is indifferent
to my argument whether sense-perception has or has not thought as
another ingredient. If sense-perception does not involve thought, then
sense-awareness and sense-perception are identical. But the something
perceived is perceived as an entity which is the terminus of the
sense-awareness, something which for thought is beyond the fact of that
sense-awareness. Also the something perceived certainly does not contain
other sense-awarenesses which are different from the sense-awareness
which is an ingredient in that perception. Accordingly nature as
disclosed in sense-perception is self-contained as against
sense-awareness, in addition to being self-contained as against thought.
I will also express this self-containedness of nature by saying that
nature is closed to mind.
This closure of nature does not carry with it any metaphysical doctrine
of the disjunction of nature and mind. It means that in sense-perception
nature is disclosed as a complex of entities whose mutual relations are
expressible in thought without reference to mind, that is, without
reference either to sense-awareness or to thought. Furthermore, I do not
wish to be understood as implying that sense-awareness and thought are
the only activities which are to be ascribed to mind. Also I am not
denying that there are relations of natural entities to mind or minds
other than being the termini of the sense-awarenesses of minds.
Accordingly I will extend the meaning of the terms 'homogeneous
thoughts' and 'heterogeneous thoughts' which have already been
introduced. We are thinking 'homogeneously' about nature when we are
thinking about it without thinking about thought or about
sense-awareness, and we are thinking 'heterogeneously' about nature when
we are thinking about it in conjunction with thinking either about
thought or about sense-awareness or about both.
I also take the homogeneity of thought about nature as excluding any
reference to moral or aesthetic values whose apprehension is vivid in
proportion to self-conscious activity. The values of nature are perhaps
the key to the metaphysical synthe
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