sis of existence. But such a synthesis
is exactly what I am not attempting. I am concerned exclusively with the
generalisations of widest scope which can be effected respecting that
which is known to us as the direct deliverance of sense-awareness.

I have said that nature is disclosed in sense-perception as a complex of
entities. It is worth considering what we mean by an entity in this
connexion. 'Entity' is simply the Latin equivalent for 'thing' unless
some arbitrary distinction is drawn between the words for technical
purposes. All thought has to be about things. We can gain some idea of
this necessity of things for thought by examination of the structure of
a proposition.

Let us suppose that a proposition is being communicated by an expositor
to a recipient. Such a proposition is composed of phrases; some of these
phrases may be demonstrative and others may be descriptive.

By a demonstrative phrase I mean a phrase which makes the recipient
aware of an entity in a way which is independent of the particular
demonstrative phrase. You will understand that I am here using
'demonstration' in the non-logical sense, namely in the sense in which a
lecturer demonstrates by the aid of a frog and a microscope the
circulation of the blood for an elementary class of medical students. I
will call such demonstration 'speculative' demonstration, remembering
Hamlet's use of the word 'speculation' when he says,

There is no speculation in those eyes.

Thus a demonstrative phrase demonstrates an entity speculatively. It may
happen that the expositor has meant some other entity--namely, the
phrase demonstrates to him an entity which is diverse from the entity
which it demonstrates to the recipient. In that case there is confusion;
for there are two diverse propositions, namely the proposition for the
expositor and the proposition for the recipient. I put this possibility
aside as irrelevant for our discussion, though in practice it may be
difficult for two persons to concur in the consideration of exactly the
same proposition, or even for one person to have determined exactly the
proposition which he is considering.

Again the demonstrative phrase may fail to demonstrate any entity. In
that case there is no proposition for the recipient. I think that we
may assume (perhaps rashly) that the expositor knows what he means.

A demonstrative phrase is a gesture. It is not itself a constituent of
the proposition, but the entity