e same;
he changed none of his habits, nothing in the form of his orders; in
reading them, you would have supposed that he had still several armies
under his command. He did not even expedite his march. Irritated only at
the prudence of Marshal Victor, he repeated his orders to him to attack
Wittgenstein, and thereby remove the danger which menaced his retreat.
As to Baraguay d'Hilliers, whom an officer had just accused, he had him
brought before him, and sent him off to Berlin, where that general,
overwhelmed by the fatigues of the retreat, and sinking under the weight
of chagrin, died before he was able to make his defence.

The unshaken firmness which the Emperor preserved was the only attitude
which became so great a spirit, and so irreparable a misfortune. But
what appears surprising, is, that he allowed fortune to strip him of
every thing, rather than sacrifice a part to save the rest. It was at
first without his orders that the commanders of corps burnt the baggage
and destroyed their artillery; he only allowed it to be done. If he
afterwards gave similar instructions, they were absolutely extorted from
him; he seemed as if he was tenacious, above every thing, that no action
of his should confess his defeat; either from a feeling that he thus
respected his misfortunes, and by his inflexibility set the example of
inflexible courage to those around him, or from that proud feeling of
men who have been long fortunate, which precipitates their downfall.

Smolensk, however, which was twice fatal to the army, was a place of
rest for some. During the respite which this afforded to their
sufferings, these were asking each other, "how it happened, that at
Moscow every thing had been forgotten; why there was so much useless
baggage; why so many soldiers had already died of hunger and cold under
the weight of their knapsacks, which were loaded with gold, instead of
food and raiment; and, above all, if three and thirty days rest had not
allowed sufficient time to make snow shoes for the artillery, cavalry,
and draught-horses, which would have made their march more sure and
rapid?

"If that had been done, we should not have lost our best men at Wiazma,
at the Wop, at the Dnieper, and along the whole road; in short, even
now, Kutusoff, Wittgenstein, and perhaps Tchitchakof would not have had
time to prepare more fatal days for us.

"But why, in the absence of orders from Napoleon, had not that
precaution been taken by the c