asiness, was the
Emperor ignorant of the joy of the Russians, when three months before he
stopped to attack Smolensk, instead of marching to the right to Elnia,
where he would have cut off the enemy's army from a retreat upon their
capital? Now that the war has returned back to the same spots, will the
Russians, whose movements are much more free than ours were then,
imitate our error? Will they keep in our rear when they can so easily
place themselves before us, on the line of our retreat?
"Is Napoleon unwilling to allow that Kutusoff's attack may be bolder and
more skilful than his own had been? Are the circumstances still the
same? Was not every thing favourable to the Russians during their
retreat, and, on the contrary, has not every thing been unfavourable to
us, in our retreat? Will not the cutting off Augereau and his brigade
upon that road open his eyes? What business had we in the burnt and
ravaged Smolensk, but to take a supply of provisions and proceed rapidly
onwards?
"But the Emperor no doubt fancied that by dating his despatches five
days from that city, he would give to his disorderly flight the
appearance of a slow and glorious retreat! This was the reason of his
ordering the destruction of the towers which surround Smolensk, from the
wish, as he expressed it, of not being again stopped short by its walls!
as if there was any idea of our returning to a place, which we did not
even know whether we should ever get out of.
"Will any one believe that he wished to give time to the artillerymen to
shoe their horses against the ice? as if he could expect any labour from
workmen emaciated with hunger and long marches; from poor wretches who
hardly found, the day long enough to procure provisions and dress them,
whose forges were thrown away or damaged, and who besides wanted the
indispensable materials for a labour so considerable.
"But perhaps he wished to allow himself time to drive on before him, out
of danger and clear of the ranks, the troublesome crowd of soldiers, who
had become useless, to rally the better sort, and to re-organize the
army? as if it were possible to convey any orders whatever to men so
scattered about, or to rally them, without lodgings, or distribution of
provisions, to _bivouacs_; in short, to think of re-organization for
corps of dying soldiers, all of whom had no longer any thing to adhere
to, and whom the least touch would dissolve."
Such, around Napoleon, were the convers
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