ommanders, all of them kings, princes, and
marshals? Had not the winter in Russia been foreseen? Was it that
Napoleon, accustomed to the active intelligence of his soldiers, had
reckoned too much upon their foresight? Had the recollection of the
campaign in Poland, during a winter as mild as that of our own climate,
deceived him, as well as an unclouded sun, whose continuance, during the
whole of the month of October, had astonished even the Russians
themselves? What spirit of infatuation is it that has seized the whole
army as well as its leader? What has every one been reckoning upon? as
even supposing that at Moscow the hope of peace had dazzled us all, it
was always necessary to return, and nothing had been prepared, even for
a pacific journey homeward!"

The greater number could not account for this general infatuation,
otherwise than by their own carelessness, and because in armies, as well
as in despotic governments, it is the office of one to think for all; in
this case that _one_ was alone regarded as responsible, and misfortune,
which authorizes distrust, led every one to condemn him. It had been
already remarked, that in this important fault, this forgetfulness, so
improbable in an active genius during so long and unoccupied a
residence, there was something of that spirit of error, "the fatal
forerunner of the fall of kings!"

Napoleon had been at Smolensk for five days. It was known that Ney had
received orders to arrive there as late as possible, and Eugene to halt
for two days at Doukhowtchina. "Then it was not the necessity of waiting
for the army of Italy which detained him! To what then must we attribute
this delay, when famine, disease and the winter, and three hostile
armies were gradually surrounding us?

"While we had been penetrating to the heart of the Russian Colossus, had
not his arms remained advanced and extended towards the Baltic and the
Black Sea? was he likely to leave them motionless now, when, instead of
striking him mortal blows, we had been struck ourselves? Was not the
fatal moment arrived when this Colossus was about to surround us with
his threatening arms? Could we imagine that we had either tied them up,
or paralysed them, by opposing to them the Austrians in the south, and
the Prussians in the north? Was it not rather a method of rendering the
Poles and the French, who were mixed with these dangerous allies,
entirely useless?

"But without going far in search of causes of une