eon, and of his winter quarters. Then only did Schwartzenberg put
himself in the rear of this hostile movement, instead of anticipating
it, as he had orders to do, leaving Regnier in the presence of Sacken,
and marching so slowly, that from the very first the admiral had got
five marches the start of him.

"On the 14th of November, at Volkowitz, Sacken attacked Regnier,
separated him from the Austrians, and pressed him so closely, that he
was obliged to call Schwartzenberg to his aid. Immediately, the latter,
as if he had been expecting the summons, retrograded, leaving Minsk to
its fate. It is true that he released Regnier, that he beat Sacken and
destroyed half his army, pursuing him as far as the Bug; but on the 16th
of November, the very day of his victory, Minsk was taken by
Tchitchakof: this was a double victory for Austria. Thus all appearances
were preserved; the new field-marshal satisfied the wishes of his
government, which was equally the enemy of the Russians whom he had just
weakened on one side, and of Napoleon, whom on the other he had betrayed
to them."

Such was the language of almost the whole of the grand army; its leader
was silent, either because he expected no more zeal on the part of an
ally, or from policy, or because he believed that Schwartzenberg had
acted with sufficient honour, in sending him the sort of notice which he
did six weeks before, when he was at Moscow.

However, he did address some reproaches to the field-marshal. To these
the latter replied, by complaining bitterly, first, of the double and
contradictory instructions which he had received, to cover Warsaw and
Minsk at the same time; and second, of the false news which had been
transmitted to him by the Duke of Bassano.

He said, "that minister had constantly represented to him that the grand
army was retreating safe and sound, in good order, and always
formidable. Why had he been trifled with, by sending him bulletins made
to deceive the idlers of the capital? His only reason for not making
greater efforts to join the grand army was, because he believed that it
was fully able to protect itself."

He also alleged his own weakness. "How could it be expected that with
twenty-eight thousand men he could so long keep sixty thousand in check?
In that situation, if Tchitchakof stole a few marches on him, was it at
all wonderful? Had he then hesitated to follow him, to leave Gallicia,
his point of departure, his magazines, and his