crimination was now out of the question." He then mentioned the
capture of Minsk, and after admitting the skilfulness of Kutusoff's
persevering manoeuvres on his right flank, declared "that he meant to
abandon his line of operations on the Minsk, unite with the Dukes of
Belluno and Reggio, cut his way through Wittgenstein's army, and regain
Wilna by turning the sources of the Berezina."

Jomini combated this plan. That Swiss general described the position of
Wittgenstein as a series of long defiles, in which his resistance might
be either obstinate or flexible, but in either way sufficiently long to
consummate our destruction. He added, that in this season, and in such a
state of disorder, a change of route would complete the destruction of
the army; that it would lose itself in the cross-roads of these barren
and marshy forests; he maintained that the high road alone could keep it
in any degree of union. Borizof, and its bridge over the Berezina, were
still open; and it would be sufficient to reach it.

He then stated that he knew of a road to the right of that town,
constructed on wooden bridges, and passing across the marshes of
Lithuania. This was the only road, by his account, by which the army
could reach Wilna by Zembin and Malodeczno, leaving Minsk on the left,
its road a day's journey longer, its fifty broken bridges rendering a
passage impracticable, and Tchitchakof in possession of it. In this
manner we should pass between the two hostile armies, avoiding them
both.

The Emperor was staggered; but as his pride revolted at the appearance
of avoiding an engagement, and he was anxious to signalize his departure
from Russia by a victory, he sent for General Dodde, of the engineers.
As soon as he saw him he called out to him, "Whether shall we retreat by
Zembin, or go and beat Wittgenstein at Smoliantzy?" and knowing that
Dodde had just come from the latter position, he asked him if it was
approachable?

His reply was, that Wittgenstein occupied a height which entirely
commanded that miry country; that it would be necessary for us to tack
about, within his sight and within his reach, by following the windings
and turnings of the road, in order to ascend to the Russian camp; that
thus our column of attack would be long exposed to their fire, first its
left and then its right flank; that this position was therefore
unapproachable in front, and that to turn it, it would be necessary to
retrograde towards Witepsk,