the common cause by covering the line of operations from
Wilna to Witepsk, which the Emperor had abandoned, he separated himself
from the second corps, retreated by Klubokoe on Vileika, and made
himself useless.

The discontent of De Wrede had existed ever since the 19th of August. He
fancied that he had contributed so great a part to the victory of the
18th, that he thought it was made too little of in the report of the
following day. This feeling had rankled in his mind, and was increased
by repeated complaints, and by the instigation of a brother, who it was
said was serving in the Austrian army. Added to this, it was believed,
that at the last period of the retreat, the Saxon general, Thielmann,
had drawn him into his plans for the liberation of Germany.

This defection was scarcely felt at the time. The Duke of Belluno, with
twenty-five thousand men, hastened from Smolensk, and on the 31st of
October effected a junction with Saint Cyr in front of Smoliantzy, at
the very moment that Wittgenstein, ignorant of this junction, and
relying on his superior strength, had crossed the Lukolmlia, imprudently
engaged himself in defiles at his rear, and attacked our out-posts. It
only required a simultaneous effort of the two French corps to have
destroyed his army completely. The generals and soldiers of the second
corps were burning with ardour. But at the moment that victory was in
their hearts, and when, believing it before their eyes, they were
waiting for the signal to engage, Victor gave orders to retreat.

Whether this prudence, which was then considered unseasonable, arose
from his unacquaintance with a country, which he then saw for the first
time, or from his distrust of soldiers whom he had not yet tried, we
know not. It is possible that he did not feel himself justified in
risking a battle, the loss of which would certainly have involved that
of the grand army and its leader.

After falling back behind the Lukolmlia, and keeping on the defensive
the whole of the day, he took advantage of the night to gain Sienno. The
Russian general then became sensible of the peril of his position; it
was so critical, that he only took advantage of our retrograde movement,
and the discouragement which it occasioned, to effect his retreat.

The officers who gave us these details added, that ever since that time
Wittgenstein seemed to think of nothing but retaking Witepsk, and
keeping on the defensive. He probably thought it to