would have adventured war. She may have counted
on England not coming in, owing to entanglements in Irish difficulties.
If so, this was just another instance of her bad judgment about the
internal affairs of other nations.

In fine, Germany had not adequately thought out or prepared for the
perils which she undertook when she assumed the risks of the war of
1914. No doubt she knew more about the shortcomings of the Russian army
than did the French or the British. On these, pretty exact knowledge of
the Russian shortages enabled her to reckon. There we miscalculated more
than she did. But she was not strong enough to make sure work of a brief
but conclusive campaign in the West, which was all she could afford
while Russia was organizing. Then, later on, she ought to have seen
that, if the submarine campaign which she undertook should bring the
United States into the war, her ultimate fate would be sealed by
blockade. In the end she no doubt fought magnificently. But she made
these mistakes, which were mainly due to that swelled-headedness which
deflected her reasoning and prevented her from calculating consequences
aright.

There was a good deal of this apparent even in 1912. It had led to the
Agadir business in the previous summer, and the absence of wise
prevision was still apparent. I believed that this phase of militarism
would pass when Imperial Germany became a more mature nation. Indeed, it
was passing under the growing influence of Social Democracy, which was
greatly increased by the elections which took place while I was in
Berlin in 1912.[3] But still there was the possibility of an explosion;
and when I returned to London, altho I was full of hope that relations
between the two countries were going to be improved, and told my
colleagues so, I also reported that there were three matters about which
I was uneasy.

The first was my strong impression that the new Fleet Law would be
insisted on.

The second was the possibility that Tirpitz might be made Chancellor of
the Empire in place of Bethmann Hollweg. This was being talked of as
possible when I was in Berlin.

The third was the want of continuity in the supreme direction of German
policy. Foreign policy especially was under divided control. Von
Tschirsky observed to me in 1906 that what he had been saying about a
question we were discussing represented his view as Foreign Minister of
Prussia, but that next door was the Chancellor, who might express quit