ouble dose of original sin,
and, on the other hand, our chauvinists were studied in Germany out of
all proportion to their small number and influence. Thus the Berlin
politicians got the wrong notions to which their tradition predisposed
them. I believe that Herr von Bethmann Hollweg was himself really more
enlightened, but he could not control the admirals and generals, or the
economists or historians or professors whom the admirals and generals
were always trying to enlist on the side of the doctrine of _Weltmacht
oder Niedergang_. Under these circumstances all that seemed possible was
to try to influence German opinion, and at the same time to insure
against the real risk of failure to accomplish this before it was too
late.

In order to make this view of German conditions intelligible, it will be
convenient in the first place to give some account of Herr von Bethmann
Hollweg's opinions as expressed in his book, and afterward to contrast
them with the views of his powerful colleague, Admiral von Tirpitz.

The ex-Imperial Chancellor commences his "_Betrachtungen zum
Weltkriege_" by going back to the day when he assumed office. When
Prince Buelow handed over the reins to him in July, 1909, the Prince gave
him his views on what, in the attitude of England, had been causing the
former much concern. We are not told what he actually said, but we can
guess it, for Bethmann Hollweg goes on to indicate the origin of the
cause of anxiety. It was King Edward's "encirclement" policy. It might
well be that the late King had no desire for war. But the result of the
policy for which he and the Ministers behind him stood was, so he
believes, that, in all differences of opinion as to external policy,
Germany found England, France, and Russia solidly against her, and was
conscious of a continuous attempt to lead Italy away from the Triple
Alliance. "People may call this '_Einkreisung_,' or policy of the
balance of power, or whatever they like. The object and the achievement
resulted in the founding of a group of nations of great power, whose
purpose was to hinder Germany at least by diplomatic means in the free
development of her growing strength." Sir Edward Grey, when taking over
the conduct of foreign policy in 1905, had declared that he would
continue the policy of the late Government. He hoped for improved
relations with Russia, and even for more satisfactory relations with
Germany, provided always that in the latter case these