ganization, first by Stosch and then
by Caprivi. Both of these had been trained in the great Moltke's ideas,
and it was because of this that, altho soldiers, they were chosen to
model the organization of the German Navy. It is true that we have
beaten the German Navy. That was because, as Tirpitz himself admits, we
possessed, not only superior numbers, but a tradition of long standing
and a spirit in our fleet which Germany had not built up. But we shall
do well not to overlook what he has to say about the procedure of basing
strategy and tactics on exact knowledge, and careful study, especially
when such ideas as that of landing small expeditionary forces on enemy
territory by means of a naval expedition, are being considered, nor what
he says of his efforts to make this procedure real. Numbers are not
always sufficient. They are not likely to be large for a long time to
come, and the study of all possibilities and of modern conditions is
therefore more important than ever. The British Army knows this. It is
not so clear that the British Navy is equally informed about the
necessity of bearing the principle in mind.

Tirpitz never served in the army, but he was brought up under the
influence of these great soldiers. His first experience was indeed
mainly in technical matters of construction. But he never let go the
true principle of an Admiral or War Staff, and the result was that he
considered, and not wholly without reason, that he was leading the
German Navy on lines which were in the end likely to make it, when fully
developed, a more powerful instrument than the British Navy. Instead of
studying merely the lessons of the past, as we here seek them in, for
instance, the history of the Seven Years' War of more than a century and
a half ago, or in the operations of Nelson carried out a hundred years
since, he insisted that the German Navy should study systematically
modern problems, and in particular combined naval and military
operations. In England we had no War Staff for the Navy until 1911, and
our Senior Admirals disliked the idea. Consequently such staff study of
military problems has never been properly developed, the wishes of our
junior naval officers notwithstanding. In Germany the idea was regarded
as a vital one throughout by Tirpitz.

The first chapter of Tirpitz's book describes the beginnings of the
German Navy. The second deals with the Stosch period. The third is
devoted to the administration of Capr