t
of German interests, and to keep watch on the method of its fulfilment.
The Chancellor, says his critic, did not hesitate to accept the decision
of the Emperor, apparently imagining that Austria's position as a Great
Power was already shaken and would collapse unless she could insist on
being compensated at the expense of the greedy Serbians. He probably had
in his mind the success obtained in the earlier Balkan crisis over
Bosnia and Herzegovina. He goes on to tell us that he was not informed
as to what the Emperor was thinking of during his tour in northern
waters, but that he had reason to believe that he did not anticipate
serious danger to the peace of the world. And he observes, as a
characteristic of the Emperor, that when he was not apprehensive of
danger he would express himself without restraint about the traditions
of his illustrious predecessors, but the moment matters began to look
critical his became a hesitating mood. The Admiral thinks that if the
Emperor had not left Berlin, and if the full Government machinery had
been at work, means might have been found by the Emperor and the
Ministry of averting the danger of war. As, however, the Chief of the
General Staff, the Head of the Admiralty Staff, and Tirpitz himself were
kept away from Berlin during the following weeks, the matter was handled
solely by the Chancellor, who, being in truth not sufficiently
experienced in great European affairs, was not able to estimate the
reliability of those who were advising him in the Foreign Office.
[Illustration: COUNT LEOPOLD BERCHTOLD
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY FROM FEB. 1912 TO JAN.
1915.]
Von Tirpitz goes on to say that by July 11 the Berlin Foreign Office had
heard that the Entente had advised yielding at Belgrade. The Chancellor,
he declares, could now have brought about a peaceful solution, but,
convinced as he was that the Entente did not mean war, he drew the
shortsighted conclusion that Austria, without considering the Entente,
might force a march into Serbia and yet not endanger the world's peace.
His optimism was disastrous. On July 13 he (the Chancellor) was,
according to Tirpitz, informed of the essential points in the proposed
Austrian ultimatum. Bethmann, as already stated, says that he did not
see the ultimatum itself until the 22nd, when it had already been
dispatched. But he does not say that he had been given no forecast of
its contents from the German Ambassador at Vien
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