would be criminal aggression.

Recognition of the belligerency of the Cuban insurgents has often
been canvassed as a possible, if not inevitable, step both in regard
to the previous ten years struggle and during the present war. I am
not unmindful that the two Houses of Congress in the spring of 1896
expressed the opinion by concurrent resolution that a condition of
public war existed requiring or justifying the recognition of a state
of belligerency in Cuba, and during the extra session the Senate voted
a joint resolution of like import, which, however, was not brought
to a vote in the House of Representatives. In the presence of these
significant expressions of the sentiment of the legislative branch it
behooves the Executive to soberly consider the conditions under which
so important a measure must needs rest for justification. It is to be
seriously considered whether the Cuban insurrection possesses beyond
dispute the attributes of statehood, which alone can demand the
recognition of belligerency in its favor. Possession, in short, of
the essential qualifications of sovereignty by the insurgents and the
conduct of the war by them according to the received code of war are
no less important factors toward the determination of the problem of
belligerency than are the influences and consequences of the struggle
upon the internal polity of the recognizing state.

The wise utterances of President Grant in his memorable message of
December 7, 1875, are signally relevant to the present situation in
Cuba, and it may be wholesome now to recall them. At that time a ruinous
conflict had for seven years wasted the neighboring island. During all
those years an utter disregard of the laws of civilized warfare and
of the just demands of humanity, which called forth expressions of
condemnation from the nations of Christendom, continued unabated.
Desolation and ruin pervaded that productive region, enormously
affecting the commerce of all commercial nations, but that of the United
States more than any other by reason of proximity and larger trade and
intercourse. At that juncture General Grant uttered these words, which
now, as then, sum up the elements of the problem:

A recognition of the independence of Cuba being, in my opinion,
impracticable and indefensible, the question which next presents itself
is that of the recognition of belligerent rights in the parties to the
contest.

In a former message to Congress[3] I