tions of the armistice.

The propositions submitted by General Woodford and the reply of the
Spanish Government were both in the form of brief memoranda, the texts
of which are before me and are substantially in the language above
given. The function of the Cuban parliament in the matter of "preparing"
peace and the manner of its doing so are not expressed in the Spanish
memorandum, but from General Woodford's explanatory reports of
preliminary discussions preceding the final conference it is understood
that the Spanish Government stands ready to give the insular congress
full powers to settle the terms of peace with the insurgents, whether by
direct negotiation or indirectly by means of legislation does not
appear.

With this last overture in the direction of immediate peace, and its
disappointing reception by Spain, the Executive is brought to the end of
his effort.

In my annual message of December last I said:

Of the untried measures there remain only: Recognition of the insurgents
as belligerents; recognition of the independence of Cuba; neutral
intervention to end the war by imposing a rational compromise between
the contestants, and intervention in favor of one or the other party.
I speak not of forcible annexation, for that can not be thought of.
That, by our code of morality, would be criminal aggression.

Thereupon I reviewed these alternatives in the light of President
Grant's measured words, uttered in 1875, when, after seven years of
sanguinary, destructive, and cruel hostilities in Cuba, he reached the
conclusion that the recognition of the independence of Cuba was
impracticable and indefensible and that the recognition of belligerence
was not warranted by the facts according to the tests of public law.
I commented especially upon the latter aspect of the question, pointing
out the inconveniences and positive dangers of a recognition of
belligerence, which, while adding to the already onerous burdens of
neutrality within our own jurisdiction, could not in any way extend our
influence or effective offices in the territory of hostilities.

Nothing has since occurred to change my view in this regard, and
I recognize as fully now as then that the issuance of a proclamation of
neutrality, by which process the so-called recognition of belligerents
is published, could of itself and unattended by other action accomplish
nothing toward the one end for which we labor--the instant pacification
o