conflict a status not
theretofore actually possessed or affect the relation of either party to
other states. The act of recognition usually takes the form of a solemn
proclamation of neutrality, which recites the _de facto_ condition
of belligerency as its motive. It announces a domestic law of neutrality
in the declaring state. It assumes the international obligations of a
neutral in the presence of a public state of war. It warns all citizens
and others within the jurisdiction of the proclaimant that they violate
those rigorous obligations at their own peril and can not expect to be
shielded from the consequences. The right of visit and search on the
seas and seizure of vessels and cargoes and contraband of war and good
prize under admiralty law must under international law be admitted
as a legitimate consequence of a proclamation of belligerency. While
according the equal belligerent rights defined by public law to each
party in our ports disfavors would be imposed on both, which, while
nominally equal, would weigh heavily in behalf of Spain herself.
Possessing a navy and controlling the ports of Cuba, her maritime rights
could be asserted not only for the military investment of the island,
but up to the margin of our own territorial waters, and a condition of
things would exist for which the Cubans within their own domain could
not hope to create a parallel, while its creation through aid or
sympathy from within our domain would be even more impossible than now,
with the additional obligations of international neutrality we would
perforce assume.

The enforcement of this enlarged and onerous code of neutrality would
only be influential within our own jurisdiction by land and sea and
applicable by our own instrumentalities. It could impart to the United
States no jurisdiction between Spain and the insurgents. It would give
the United States no right of intervention to enforce the conduct of the
strife within the paramount authority of Spain according to the
international code of war.

For these reasons I regard the recognition of the belligerency of the
Cuban insurgents as now unwise, and therefore inadmissible. Should that
step hereafter be deemed wise as a measure of right and duty, the
Executive will take it.

Intervention upon humanitarian grounds has been frequently suggested and
has not failed to receive my most anxious and earnest consideration.
But should such a step be now taken, when it is apparent that