fied by the special
commission appointed to try him, joined the enemies of his country, and
paid a penalty to the republic as heavy as it was deserved. I conclude,
then, that the plea of having acted in the interests of a friend is not
a valid excuse for a wrong action. For, seeing that a belief in a man's
virtue is the original cause of friendship, friendship can hardly remain
if virtue he abandoned. But if we decide it to be right to grant our
friends whatever they wish, and to ask them for whatever we wish,
perfect wisdom must be assumed on both sides if no mischief is to
happen. But we cannot assume this perfect wisdom; for we are speaking
only of such friends as are ordinarily to be met with, whether we have
actually seen them or have been told about them--men, that is to say, of
everyday life. I must quote some examples of such persons, taking care
to select such as approach nearest to our standard of wisdom. We read,
for instance, that Papus Aemilius was a close friend of Gaius Luscinus.
History tells us that they were twice consuls together, and colleagues
in the censorship. Again, it is on record that Manius Curius and
Tiberius Coruncanius were on the most intimate terms with them and with
each other. Now, we cannot even suspect that any one of these men ever
asked of his friend anything that militated against his honour or his
oath or the interests of the republic. In the case of such men as these
there is no point in saying that one of them would not have obtained
such a request if he had made it; for they were men of the most
scrupulous piety, and the making of such a request would involve a
breach of religious obligation no less than the granting it. However,
it is quite true that Gaius Carbo and Gaius Cato did follow Tiberius
Gracchus; and though his brother Caius Gracchus did not do so at the
time, he is now the most eager of them all.

12. We may then lay down this rule of friendship--neither ask nor
consent to do what is wrong. For the plea "for friendship's sake" is a
discreditable one, and not to be admitted for a moment. This rule
holds good for all wrong-doing, but more especially in such as involves
disloyalty to the republic. For things have come to such a point with
us, my dear Fannius and Scaevola, that we are bound to look somewhat far
ahead to what is likely to happen to the republic. The constitution, as
known to our ancestors, has already swerved somewhat from the regular
course and the line