nt in attack. Such actions are nut creditable in our own
interests, but highly so in those of our friends. There are many
advantages too which men of upright character voluntarily forego, or
of which they are content to be deprived, that their friends may enjoy
them rather than themselves.
The second doctrine is that which limits friendship to an exact equality
in mutual good offices and good feelings. But such a view reduces
friendship to a question of figures in a spirit far too narrow and
illiberal, as though the object were to have an exact balance in
a debtor and creditor account. True friendship appears to me to be
something richer and more generous than that comes to; and not to be so
narrowly on its guard against giving more than it receives. In such a
matter we must not be always afraid of something being wasted or running
over in our measure, or of more than is justly due being devoted to our
friendship.
But the last limit proposed is the worst, namely, that a friend's
estimate of himself is to be the measure of our estimate of him. It
often happens that a man has too humble an idea of himself, or takes too
despairing a view of his chance of bettering his fortune. In such a case
a friend ought not to take the view of him which he takes of himself.
Rather he should do all he can to raise his drooping spirits, and lead
him to more cheerful hopes and thoughts.
We must then find some other limit. But I must first mention the
sentiment which used to call forth Scipio's severest criticism. He often
said that no one ever gave utterance to anything more diametrically
opposed to the spirit of friendship than the author of the dictum, "You
should love your friend with the consciousness that you may one day
hate him." He could not be induced to believe that it was rightfully
attributed to Bias, who was counted as one of the Seven Sages. It was
the sentiment of some person with sinister motives or selfish ambition,
or who regarded everything as it affected his own supremacy. How can a
man be friends with another, if he thinks it possible that he may be his
enemy? Why, it will follow that he must wish and desire his friend
to commit as many mistakes as possible, that he may have all the
more handles against him; and, conversely, that he must be annoyed,
irritated, and jealous at the right actions or good fortune of his
friends. This maxim, then, let it be whose it will, is the utter
destruction of friendship. The tru
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