ugh what surprises me is that a man of his
proud and overbearing character should have a friend at all. And as it
was his character that prevented his having genuine friends, so it often
happens in the case of men of unusually great means--their very wealth
forbids faithful friendships. For not only is Fortune blind herself;
but she generally makes those blind also who enjoy her favours. They are
carried, so to speak, beyond themselves with self-conceit and self-will;
nor can anything be more perfectly intolerable than a successful fool.
You may often see it. Men who before had pleasant manners enough undergo
a complete change on attaining power of office. They despise their old
friends: devote themselves to new.
Now, can anything be more foolish than that men who have all the
opportunities which prosperity, wealth, and great means can bestow,
should secure all else which money can buy--horses, servants, splendid
upholstering, and costly plate--but do not secure friends, who are, if
I may use the expression, the most valuable and beautiful furniture
of life? And yet, when they acquire the former, they know not who will
enjoy them, nor for whom they may be taking all this trouble; for they
will one and all eventually belong to the strongest: while each man has
a stable and inalienable ownership in his friendships. And even if those
possessions, which are, in a manner, the gifts of fortune, do prove
permanent, life can never be anything but joyless which is without the
consolations and companionship of friends.
16. To turn to another branch of our subject. We must now endeavour
to ascertain what limits are to be observed in friendship--what is the
boundary-line, so to speak, beyond which our affection is not to go. On
this point I notice three opinions, with none of which I agree. One is
_that we should love our friend just as much as we love ourselves, and
no more; another, that our affection to them should exactly correspond
and equal theirs to us; a third, that a man should be valued at exactly
the same rate as he values himself_. To not one of these opinions do I
assent. The first, which holds that our regard for ourselves is to be
the measure of our regard for our friend, is not true; for how many
things there are which we would never have done for our own sakes, but
do for the sake of a friend! We submit to make requests from unworthy
people, to descend even to supplication; to be sharper in invective,
more viole
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