hority to the Union; where it granted in one
instance an authority to the Union, and in another prohibited the States
from exercising the like authority; and where it granted an authority
to the Union, to which a similar authority in the States would be
absolutely and totally CONTRADICTORY and REPUGNANT. I use these terms to
distinguish this last case from another which might appear to resemble
it, but which would, in fact, be essentially different; I mean where the
exercise of a concurrent jurisdiction might be productive of occasional
interferences in the POLICY of any branch of administration, but
would not imply any direct contradiction or repugnancy in point of
constitutional authority. These three cases of exclusive jurisdiction
in the federal government may be exemplified by the following instances:
The last clause but one in the eighth section of the first article
provides expressly that Congress shall exercise "EXCLUSIVE LEGISLATION"
over the district to be appropriated as the seat of government. This
answers to the first case. The first clause of the same section empowers
Congress "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises"; and
the second clause of the tenth section of the same article declares
that, "NO STATE SHALL, without the consent of Congress, lay any imposts
or duties on imports or exports, except for the purpose of executing its
inspection laws." Hence would result an exclusive power in the Union
to lay duties on imports and exports, with the particular exception
mentioned; but this power is abridged by another clause, which declares
that no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State;
in consequence of which qualification, it now only extends to the DUTIES
ON IMPORTS. This answers to the second case. The third will be found in
that clause which declares that Congress shall have power "to establish
an UNIFORM RULE of naturalization throughout the United States." This
must necessarily be exclusive; because if each State had power to
prescribe a DISTINCT RULE, there could not be a UNIFORM RULE.

A case which may perhaps be thought to resemble the latter, but which
is in fact widely different, affects the question immediately under
consideration. I mean the power of imposing taxes on all articles other
than exports and imports. This, I contend, is manifestly a concurrent
and coequal authority in the United States and in the individual States.
There is plainly no expression in