y the property of another with
the intent of appropriation, but comprises also all corporeal dealing
with the property of another against the will of the owner. Thus, for
a pawnee to use the thing which he has in pawn, or to use a thing
committed to one's keeping as a deposit, or to put a thing which is lent
for use to a different use than that for which it was lent, is theft; to
borrow plate, for instance, on the representation that the borrower
is going to entertain his friends, and then to carry it away into the
country: or to borrow a horse for a drive, and then to take it out of
the neighbourhood, or like the man in the old story, to take it into
battle.

7 With regard, however, to those persons who put a thing lent for use to
a different purpose than the lender contemplated, the rule is that they
are guilty of theft only if they know it to be contrary to the will of
the owner, and that if he had notice he would refuse permission; but
if they believe that he would give permission, it is not theft: and the
distinction is just, for there is no theft without unlawful intention.

8 It is also said not to be theft if a man turns a thing lent for use to
a use other than he believes its owner would sanction, though in point
of fact its owner is consenting. Whence arose the following question:
if Antoninus solicits the slave of Peri to steal property of the latter,
and convey it to him, and the slave informs Peri of it, who, wishing
to detect Antoninus in the very act, allows the slave to convey the
property to him; can an action of theft, or for corrupting the slave, or
neither, be maintained against Antoninus? The case was submitted to us,
and we examined the conflicting opinions of the earlier jurists on the
matter: some of whom thought that neither action lay, and others, that
Peri might sue on theft only. But we, in order to put an end to such
quibbles, have enacted by our decision that in such case both the action
on theft and that for corrupting a slave shall lie. It is true that the
slave has not been corrupted by the advances made to him, so that the
case does not come within the rules which introduced the action for
such corruption: yet the wouldbe corrupter's intention was to make him
dishonest, so that he is liable to a penal action, exactly as if the
slave had actually been corrupted, lest his immunity from punishment
should encourage others to perpetrate a similar wrong on a slave less
strong to resist tempt