g the one or going down the other, is killed or injured
in any part of his body, a modified action is in all these cases given
against him. But if a slave is pushed off a bridge or bank into a
river, and there drowned, it is clear from the facts that the damage
is substantially done by the body of the offender, who is consequently
liable directly under the lex Aquilia. If damage be done, not by the
body or to a body, but in some other form, neither the direct nor the
modified Aquilian action will lie, though it is held that the wrongdoer
is liable to an action on the case; as, for instance, where a man is
moved by pity to loose another's slave from his fetters, and so enables
him to escape.

TITLE IV. OF INJURIES

By injury, in a general sense, is meant anything which is done without
any right. Besides this, it has three special significations;
for sometimes it is used to express outrage, the proper word for
which--contumely--is derived from the verb 'to contemn,' and so is
equivalent to the Greek 'ubris': sometimes it means culpable negligence,
as where damage is said to be done (as in the lex Aquilia) 'with
injury,' where it is equivalent to the Greek 'adikema'; and sometimes
iniquity and injustice, which the Greeks express by 'adikia'; thus a
litigant is said to have received an 'injury' when the praetor or judge
delivers an unjust judgement against him.

1 An injury or outrage is inflicted not only by striking with the
first, a stick, or a whip, but also by vituperation for the purpose of
collecting a crowd, or by taking possession of a man's effects on
the ground that he was in one's debt; or by writing, composing, or
publishing defamatory prose or verse, or contriving the doing of any of
these things by some one else; or by constantly following a matron, or
a young boy or girl below the age of puberty, or attempting anybody's
chastity; and, in a word, by innumerable other acts.

2 An outrage or injury may be suffered either in one's own person, or
in the person of a child in one's power, or even, as now is generally
allowed, in that of one's wife. Accordingly, if you commit an 'outrage'
on a woman who is married to Titius, you can be sued not only in her own
name, but also in those of her father, if she be in his power, and of
her husband. But if, conversely, it be the husband who is outraged, the
wife cannot sue; for wives should be protected by their husbands, not
husbands by their wives. Finally, a fa