y his principal; and the rule is the same if a guardian,
curator, or other person who has undertaken the management of another's
affairs begins an action through an attorney.

4 If a defendant appears, and is ready to appoint an attorney to defend
the action for him, he can do this either by coming personally into
court, and confirming the appointment by the solemn stipulations
employed when security is given for satisfaction of judgement, or by
giving security out of court whereby, as surety for his attorney, he
guarantees the observance of all the clauses of the socalled security
for satisfaction of judgement. In all such cases, he is obliged to give
a right of hypothec over all his property, whether the security be given
in or out of court, and this right avails against his heirs no less than
against himself. Finally, he has to enter into a personal engagement
or recognizance to appear in court when judgement is delivered; and in
default of such appearance his surety will have to pay all the damages
to which he is condemned, unless notice of appeal is given.

5 If, however, the defendant for some reason or other does not appear,
and another will defend for him, he may do so, and it is immaterial
whether the action be real or personal, provided he will give security
for satisfaction of the judgement in full; for we have already mentioned
the old rule, that no one is allowed to defend another without security.

6 All this will appear more clearly and fully by reference to the daily
practice of the courts, and to actual cases of litigation:

7 and it is our pleasure that these rules shall hold not only in this
our royal city, but also in all our provinces, although it may be
that through ignorance the practice elsewhere was different: for it
is necessary that the provinces generally shall follow the lead of the
capital of our empire, that is, of this royal city, and observe its
usages.

TITLE XII. OF ACTIONS PERPETUAL AND TEMPORAL, AND WHICH MAY BE BROUGHT
BY AND AGAINST HEIRS

It should be here observed that actions founded on statutes,
senatusconsults, and imperial constitutions could be brought at any
length of time from the accrual of the cause of action, until certain
limits were fixed for actions both real and personal by imperial
enactments; while actions which were introduced by the praetor in the
exercise of his jurisdiction could, as a rule, be brought only within a
year, that being the duration of