banks; for
he who demands such order is the plaintiff, and he who is attempting
to do the act in question is defendant. Of double interdicts we have
examples in Uti possidetis and Utrubi; they are called double because
the footing of both parties is equal, neither being exclusively
plaintiff or defendant, but each sustaining the double role.

8 To speak of the procedure and result of interdicts under the older law
would now be a waste of words; for when the procedure is what is called
'extraordinary,' as it is nowadays in all actions, the issue of an
interdict is unnecessary, the matter being decided without any such
preliminary step in much the same way as if it had actually been taken,
and a modified action had arisen on it.

TITLE XVI. OF THE PENALTIES FOR RECKLESS LITIGATION

It should here be observed that great pains have been taken by those
who in times past had charge of the law to deter men from reckless
litigation, and this is a thing that we too have at heart. The best
means of restraining unjustifiable litigation, whether on the part of
a plaintiff or of a defendant, are money fines, the employment of the
oath, and the fear of infamy.

1 Thus under our constitution, the oath has to be taken by every
defendant, who is not permitted even to state his defence until he
swears that he resists the plaintiff's claim because he believes that
his cause is a good one. In certain cases where the defendant denies his
liability the action is for double or treble the original claim, as in
proceedings on unlawful damages, and for recovery of legacies bequeathed
to religious places. In various actions the damages are multiplied at
the outset; in an action on theft detected in the commission they are
quadrupled; for simple theft they are doubled; for in these and some
other actions the damages are a multiple of the plaintiff's loss,
whether the defendant denies or admits the claim. Vexatious litigation
is checked on the part of the plaintiff also, who under our constitution
is obliged to swear on oath that his action is commenced in good faith;
and similar oaths have to be taken by the advocates of both parties, as
is prescribed in other of our enactments. Owing to these substitutes the
old action of dishonest litigation has become obsolete. The effect
of this was to penalize the plaintiff in a tenth part of the value he
claimed by action; but, as a matter of fact, we found that the penalty
was never exacted, and