giving of money in order to induce one man to bring a
vexatious suit against another, or to desist from a suit when brought.
Under our constitution too a statutory condiction lies for the recovery
of fourfold damages from officers of the court, who exact money from
defendants in excess of its provisions.

26 There is this difference between the actions on simple theft and for
the corruption of a slave, and the other of which we spoke in connexion
with them, that by the two former double damages are recoverable under
any circumstances; the latter, namely the action on unlawful damage
under the lex Aquilia, and that on certain kinds of deposit, entail
double damages on the defendant only if he denies his liability; if he
admits it, simple damages alone can be recovered. The damages are double
under an action for recovery of legacies left to religious places not
only when the liability is denied, but also when the defendant delays
payment until sued by the order of a magistrate; if he admits his
liability, and pays before being so sued, he cannot be compelled to pay
more than the original debt.

27 The action on intimidation also differs from the others which we
mentioned in the same connexion, in that it contains in its very nature
an implied condition that the defendant is entitled to acquittal if, on
being so ordered by the judge, he restores to the plaintiff the property
of which the latter has been deprived. In other actions of the same
class this is not so; for instance, in the action on theft detected
in the commission, the defendant has under any circumstances to pay
fourfold damages.

28 Again, some actions are equitable, others are actions of strict
law. To the former class belong the actions on sale, hire, unauthorised
agency, agency proper, deposit, partnership, guardianship, loan for use,
mortgage, division of a 'family,' partition of joint property, those
on the innominate contracts of sale by commission and exchange, and the
suit for recovery of an inheritance. Until quite recently it was a moot
point whether the lastnamed was properly an equitable action, but our
constitution has definitely decided the question in the affirmative.

29 Formerly too the action for the recovery of a dowry was an equitable
action: but as we found that the action on stipulation was more
convenient, we have, while establishing many distinctions, attached
all the advantages which the former remedy possessed to the action
on st