ts. Everybody who
read the court's words understood that, in this case, it was precisely
the merely abstract conception of something technically defined as a
"restraint of trade" which the court wished, not to make sovereign,
but to subordinate to the wider intuition of a fair-minded observer of
the whole result, of a given sort of corporate combination. The {87}
"rule of reason" was intended to bring the whole question out of the
realm of barren abstractions and of mere analysis, and nearer to the
realm where the trained observation of the fair minded man would
decide the case--nearer, in fact, to the realm of intuition. Only, the
decisive intuition must be something broad, and far-seeing, and
synthetic, and fair.
Now I submit that this meaning of the word reason is perfectly
familiar to all of you. Reason, from this point of view, is the power
to see widely and steadily and connectedly. Its true opponent is not
intuition, but whatever makes us narrow in outlook, and consequently
the prey of our own caprices. The unreasonable person is the person
who can see but one thing at a time, when he ought to see two or many
things together; who can grasp but one idea, when a synthesis of ideas
is required. The reasonable man is capable of synopsis, of viewing
both or many sides of a question, of comparing various motives, of
taking interest in a totality rather than in a scattered multiplicity.
You may, of course, admit that this use of the word reason is
familiar; and still you may say that James's contention is
nevertheless sound. For, as you may declare, the real issue is not
regarding the meanings that chance to be linked with the word reason,
but regarding the relative impotence of that process which James chose
to call by this name. As a fact, so you may assert, there exists the
familiar process of forming abstract {88} conceptions; and there also
exists the process of drawing conclusions through an analysis of what
is already contained in the meaning of the assumed premises. Whether
or no one calls these two processes, in their usual combination, by
the name reasoning, James is right in saying that abstractions, and
that such sorts of purely analytic abstract reasoning as he has in
mind, are incapable of giving us religious insight. And both James and
the others who oppose reason to concrete experience are right in
asserting that you get no novel insight whatever through mere
abstractions, or through mere analysis, b
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