nal experience. And,
in view of such oppositions, it will be perfectly fair to define
reason as the power to get articulate insight--insight into wholes
rather than fragments. It will also be fair to define the reasoning
process as the process of getting connected experience on a large
scale.

Whoever views the matter thus will indeed not be forced to be a
one-sided partisan of the reasoning process as thus defined. He will,
first, fully admit that the formation of abstract ideas is but a means
{92} to an end, and that this end is the enlargement of the range of
our view of the connections of our experience. He will secondly admit
that, as soon as the process of forming abstract ideas is pursued as
an end in itself, pedantry and formalism result, whether the topic be
one of religion, or of science, or of the world's daily work. He will
further agree with James, and with the empiricists generally, that
merely analytic reasoning, if such were, in its isolation, a possible
thing, would be indeed "barren intellectualism." And finally, if he is
wise, he will go still further. He will not despise instinct, and
feeling, and the movings of faith, and the inarticulate intuitions.
For he will know that all these things are human, are indispensable,
and are the basis upon which the genuine work of the reason, the wider
view of life, must be carried toward its fulfilment. For whoever is to
comprehend the unities of life must first live. Whoever is to be best
able to survey the landscape from the mountain top must first have
wandered in its paths and its byways, and must have grown familiar
with its valleys and its recesses. Whoever is to get the mature
insight must first have become a little child.

But whoever, remembering the New Testament word about becoming as a
little child, one-sidedly defends the inarticulate intuitions, as the
only source of religious insight, should remember also the word of St.
Paul: "When I was a child, I spake as a child, I thought as a child, I
understood as a {93} child; but when I became a man I put away
childish things."

It is the business of reason not to make naught of the indispensable
intuitions of the childlike and of the faithful, but to work toward
the insight such that, if we possessed it, we should "know even as we
are known." That which is weak in this world may indeed confound many
who are called wise; but there is no objection to its becoming also
truly wise itself. For then it woul