his need satisfied, it centres about the knowledge of that
which has delivered the needy from their danger. It appeals for help,
or waits patiently for the Lord, or rejoices in the presence of
salvation. It therefore may assume any one of many different attitudes
toward the problem of duty. It may seek salvation through deeds, or
again it may not, in the minds of some men, appeal to the active
nature in any vigorous way whatever. Some religious moods are passive,
contemplative, receptive, adoring rather than strenuous. It is
therefore quite consistent with the existence of a religious interest
to feel suspicious of the dutiful restlessness of many ardent souls.

"They also serve who only stand and wait."

{171}
Such is sometimes the comforting, sometimes the warning word that
seems to many to express the religious interest.

This general contrast between the two interests assumes many special
forms when we consider how moralists--that is, teachers who especially
emphasise the call of duty--may stand related to the two postulates
upon which, as we have seen, the higher religions base their appeal.
Religion, in our sense of the word, depends upon asserting: (1) That
there is some one highest end of existence, some goal of life, some
chief good; and (2) That, by nature, man is in great danger of
completely failing to attain this good, so that he needs to be saved
from this danger.

Now the first of these two postulates religion has frequently,
although not always, shared with the moralists, that is, with those
who devote themselves to teaching us how to act rightly. Aristotle,
for instance, based his ethical doctrine (one of the most influential
books in the history of morals) upon the postulate that there is a
highest good. Many others who have discussed or have preached
morality, have asserted that all obligations are subject to one
ultimate obligation, which is the requirement to act with reference to
the highest good. Yet this agreement as to the highest good turns out
to be not quite universal when one compares the opinions of the
teachers of religion, on the one hand, and of the moralists on the
other. Popular and traditional morality often takes the form of a
little hoard of {172} maxims about right acts--maxims whose relations
to one another, and to any one highest goal of life, remain obscure.
Each maxim is supposed to define a duty. Of course it also tells us
how to win some special good or how to avoid so