, that the general principle, "Evil ought simply to be
put out of existence," does _not_ express our whole attitude toward
all evils, and gives only an imperfect account either of our more
common-place and elemental or of our more elevated, heroic, and
reasonable estimates of life.

The principle: "Evil ought to be simply abolished," is, indeed, one
that we unquestionably apply, in our ordinary life, to a vast range of
natural ills. But it is not universal. Let us first indicate its
apparent range. Physical pain, when sufficiently violent, is an
example of an ill that appears to us, in all its greater
manifestations, plainly intolerable. So it seems to us to illustrate
the principle that "Evil ought to be put out of existence." We desire,
with regard to it, simply its abolition. The same is true of what one
may call _unassimilated_ griefs of all levels--the shocks of calamity
at the moment when they first strike, the anguish of loss or of
disappointment precisely when these things are new to us and appear to
have no place in our life-plan. These are typical ills. And they all
illustrate ills that seem to us to be worthy only of destruction. The
magnitude of such ills as factors in {233} the individual and in the
social world often appears to us immeasurable. Pestilence, famine, the
cruelties of oppressors, the wrecks of innocent human lives by cruel
fortunes--all these seem, for our ordinary estimates, facts that we
can in no wise assimilate, justify, or reasonably comprehend. That is,
we can see, in the single case, no reason why such events should form
part of human life--except that so it indeed is. They seem, to our
natural understanding, simply opaque data of experience, to be
annulled or removed if we can. And to such ills, from our human point
of view, the principle: "They ought to be simply driven out of
existence," is naturally applied without limitation. The apparent
range of this principle is therefore, indeed, very wide.

Now it forms no part of our present discourse to consider in detail
the possible theological or metaphysical basis for a possible
explanation of such ills, I have elsewhere written too much and too
often about the problem of evil to be subject to the accusation of
neglecting the pathos and the tragedy of these massive ills. This,
however, I can at once say. _In so far as_ ills appear to us thus,
they are, indeed, _no_ sources of religious insight. On the other
hand, even when thus viewed,