rious facts.
And such usage is convenient. The word reason, as I have just {100}
exemplified its more synthetic meaning, calls our attention precisely
to that aspect of our better insight which is involved in our power to
grasp many facts in their _unity_, to see the coherence, the
inter-relationship, the totality of a set of experiences. Now when
insight reaches higher levels, these various aspects of our knowledge
are never sundered. But as we grow toward higher insight, we know in
part and prophesy in part and are child-like in so far as that which
is perfect has not yet come.
In these, our imperfect stages of growth, sometimes our knowledge
possesses intimacy, but still has to remain content, for the moment,
with a more inarticulate grasp of deeper meanings. In such cases
James's sort of intuition, or what is often called blind faith, is
mainly in question. And this is indeed a stage on the way to insight.
We feel unities but do not see them. Sometimes, however, as in much of
our ordinary experience, the state of our minds is different; our
knowledge revels in, or else contends with, the endless variety and
multiplicity of the facts of life, and lacks a grasp of their unity.
In that case our insight is often called "merely empirical." We have
experience; and so far our knowledge prospers. But we neither feel
vaguely nor see clearly the total sense of things. And in such cases
our sight is too busy to give us time for higher insight. As the
Germans say, we do not see the wood because of the trees.
In a third stage of partial insight we may stand {101} where, for
instance, the masters of the exact sciences stand. We then grasp, with
clearness, larger unities of controllable experience. We create
objects, as the mathematicians create, in an ideal world of our own
contemplation; and we then come to see that these ideal creations of
ours do, indeed, reveal the eternal truth regarding a world of
seemingly impersonal or superpersonal reality. We learn of this
reality through the coherent synthesis of our ideal constructions. Our
intuition is in this case at once empirical, articulate, and such as
to survey the broad landscape of the genuine relations of things. But
alas! in most such cases our objects, although they are indeed
presented to our rational intuition, are often abstract enough in
their seeming. They are objects such as numbers, and series, and
ordered arrays of highly ideal entities. In such cases the reaso
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