n case it is the object, and the very being, of such an
insight, of such an inclusive experience, of such a view of what is.
For, when you hold any opinions whatever about the real world, or
about any of its contents, characters, or values, your opinions are
either true or false, and are true or false by virtue of their actual
conformity to the live insight which experiences what makes them true
or false, and which therefore _ipso facto_ experiences what the real
world is. If there is no such world-possessing insight, then, once
more, your opinions about the world are neither true nor false. Or,
otherwise stated, if there is no such inclusive insight there is no
world. To the real world, then, this insight which comprehends the
world, and which knows whatever is true to be true, and whatever is
false about the world to be false--to the real world this insight, I
say, belongs. And the whole world belongs to it and is its object and
essence. Whatever is real is real for that insight, and is in its
experience, and exists as its possession, and as its well-known and
well-comprehended content, and as its image and expression and
meaning.
All this I say, as you may note, not because I hold in high esteem any
of our private human {114} opinions, but only because, _except in the
light of such an all-seeing comprehension of facts as they are, our
individual opinions about the world cannot even be false_. For
opinion, in all its fleeting blindness and in its human chaos of
caprices, is ceaselessly an appeal to the judge, to the seer, to the
standard experience, to the knower of facts as they are, to the wider
view, to the decisive insight. And opinions about reality in its
wholeness, about the world, about the all, are appeals to the
all-judging insight, to the all-seeing view, to the knowledge and
experience that grasps the totality of facts, to the widest outlook,
to the deepest insight, to the absolute rational decision. If this be
so, then an opinion to the effect that there exists no such widest and
deepest insight, and no such final view, is itself just such an appeal
to the final insight, simply because it is an opinion about reality.
To assert then that there is no largest view, no final insight, no
experience that is absolute, is to assert that the largest view
observes that there is no largest view, that the final insight sees
that there is no such insight, that the ultimate experience is aware
that there is no ultima
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