ing Cadiz.
His letter asking for information on several topics is missing; but
Spencer's letter to Grenville throws so much light on the situation that
I quote parts of it, summarizing the remainder:[503]

Admiralty, _April 6, 1798_.

"I send you by Mr. Pitt's desire a sketch I have made out of
answers to the queries he put down upon paper yesterday in
Downing Street. The result is to my mind a decision which I fear
will not tally very well with our wishes and the views you have
formed as the groundwork of the communication at present
proposed with Vienna." He then states that, even if a Russian
squadron appears in the North Sea, yet we cannot keep a
permanent squadron in the Mediterranean. "For that purpose we
should at least have 70 sail, as the Channel cannot be trusted
with safety with less than 35, including the coast of Ireland,
and the remaining 35 would be but barely enough to watch Cadiz
and command the Mediterranean. Our best plan appears to me to be
to maintain as long as we can a position between Lisbon and
Cadiz, and when we are excluded (which I conclude we soon shall
be) from the Tagus, to send Lord St. Vincent with the fleet he
now has to take a sweep round the Mediterranean and do all the
mischief he can to the French navy." If, he adds, the Spaniards
come northward, our home fleet can deal with them: if they go to
the Mediterranean and join the French there will not be much
danger from so ill-combined a force when opposed to St.
Vincent's fleet, "which I consider as being the best formed to
act together that perhaps ever existed." If Austria would be
satisfied with our sweeping round the Mediterranean, Spencer
advocates that plan, but not that of keeping a fleet there,
"because, exclusive of the great expense, it would leave the
Spaniards too much at liberty."

In answer to Pitt's questions Spencer states the force
disposable for the Channel and the coast of Ireland as 34, for
the Mediterranean 24; 3 more were fitting for sea, and 8 others
were nearing completion; but the chief deficiency was in men,
8,000 more being needed. He adds that the Neapolitans have 4
sail-of-the-line and 7 frigates: the French have 6 sail at
Corfu; but he thinks not more than 10 sail can be equipped at
Toulon. He regards the Venetian fleet as valueles