n efforts to reduce France within her old limits,
England's duty being to offer help on the Riviera, to make a dash at
Brest, and to seize Belleisle as a base of supplies for the Breton
royalists, now once more in revolt. It is significant that Dundas wrote
to Pitt on 4th January expressing his belief that Bonaparte must be
serious in his desire for peace because he had no other game to
play.[528]
Many influences conspired to mar these hopes. The enterprises against
Brest and Belleisle proved to be impracticable, and a landing at
Quiberon failed because the Breton rising occurred too soon. The
royalists of Provence did not rise at all. An attempt by Sir James
Pulteney and a small force upon Ferrol was an utter failure. All the
operations were paralysed by uncertainty as to the future conduct of
Russia. The indignation of the Czar against Austria extended to England
after the failure of the joint expedition to Holland; and his testiness
increased owing to maritime disputes and the friction caused by the
outrages of his troops in the Channel Islands. In the Riviera the
Austrians continued their successes, and finally shut up Massena in
Genoa, where the British fleet rendered valuable service. But it is not
surprising to find Grenville writing on 10th April to Dundas: "For God's
sake, for your own honour, and for the cause in which we are engaged, do
not let us, after having by immense exertions collected a fine army,
leave it unemployed, gaping after messengers from Genoa, Augsburg, and
Vienna till the moment for acting is irrecoverably passed by."
This, however, was the outcome of events. The French, acting on interior
lines, and propelled by the will of Bonaparte, utterly crushed these
sporadic efforts. The Royalists were quelled or pacified, the coasts
were well guarded, while the First Consul, crossing the Great St.
Bernard, overthrew the Austrians at Marengo (14th June). Before long
Naples made peace with the conqueror. Meanwhile the Sea Power, operating
on diverse coasts, delayed, but did not reverse, the progress of the
French arms. British forces for a time defended Portugal and held
Minorca and the citadel of Messina, but without any appreciable effect
on Spain or Italy. The fleet played an important part in starving out
the French garrisons of Genoa and Valetta. But elsewhere the action, or
inaction, of the British forces was discreditable. True, the conditions
were adverse, but an army numbering more than 80
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