jutor, Colonel Moore. This brilliant young
officer, by nature somewhat a _frondeur_, was finally guilty of
expressions so disrespectful as to lead to his removal shortly before
that of Paoli. He carried his complaints to Pitt, who bade him set forth
his case dispassionately. Indeed, so impressed was he with Moore's
abilities, that he decided to employ him in the West Indies, and
afterwards advanced him to posts of high importance.

Pitt took little interest in Corsica, leaving it to the intermittent
attentions of Portland. Consequently that interesting experiment had not
a fair chance. The possession of the island was also nearly useless in a
military sense; for the British garrison could spare no detachments,
which, even with the help of the loyal Corsicans, could effectively
harass the French forces campaigning in the Genoese Riviera. Elliot
entered into relations with the Knights of Malta, and in other ways
sought to develop a Mediterranean policy; but in this he met with scant
support from London. In excuse of Pitt it must be said that he had his
hands more than full elsewhere. Moreover the peace between France and
Spain, framed in July 1795, caused him great concern, especially as the
Court of Madrid manifested deep resentment at the British occupation of
Corsica. In October 1795 Pitt inclined strongly towards peace, and
thenceforth carried on the war mainly with a view to securing
indemnities. Corsica apparently he now looked on as burdensome; for in
his speech of 9th December 1795 he did not include it among the three
valued acquisitions of the war--Martinique, Cape Nicholas Mole (in
Hayti), and the Cape of Good Hope. Dundas always looked on the
occupation of Corsica as prejudicial to the colonial efforts which held
the first place in his thoughts. Accordingly it was not utilized in the
spring of 1796, when expeditions ought to have set forth to hamper the
march of Bonaparte's ill-equipped columns along the coast from Nice to
Savona.

The opportunity then lost was never to return. Bonaparte's triumphs in
Italy enabled him to prepare at Leghorn to deal a blow for the recovery
of his native island. Checked for the time by the other claims of the
war and the presence of Nelson, he kept this aim in view; and the
conquest of North and Central Italy at the close of that campaign
compromised the safety of the small British and _emigre_ force in
Corsica. The final reason, however, for the evacuation of the island was
n