ion under the
Administration at the head of which you placed Mr. Addington,
that I was doing you service. It was of no small importance to
you, whether you looked to a return to office, or to retirement
from public life, that the Government should not fall into the
hands of those who had been engaged in violent opposition to
you; and you yourself stated to me that you apprehended that
must be the consequence if Mr. Addington should not be able to
form an Administration.... Some of your last words to me induce
me to think that you have not yourself abandoned the plan formed
for giving to the Roman Catholic Church full establishment in
Ireland--for such I consider the plan suggested by Lord
Castlereagh, with any modification of which it is capable.
Indeed, if all those who went out of office because that measure
was not approved then (such being the ostensible cause of their
quitting their stations) are to come into office again, there
can be no doubt in the mind of the public that it is determined
to carry that measure....

That at so critical a juncture a supporter of Addington, not of Cabinet
rank, should rake up personal reasons why Pitt should let things drift
to ruin is inconceivable. And did Redesdale really believe Protestantism
to be endangered by Pitt's return to office, after his assurance at
Bromley that he would not press any point at variance with the royal
resolves? The King, who knew Pitt far better than Redesdale did, had no
fear that he would belie his word by bringing forward Catholic
Emancipation. But the phrases in the letter quoted above show that some
of the Ministers were preparing to beat the drum ecclesiastic, and, in
the teeth of the evidence, to charge Pitt with ingratitude and duplicity
if he became Prime Minister. Ignoring the national crisis, they
concentrated attention solely on the personal questions at issue; and it
is humiliating to have to add that their petty scheming won the day. A
compromise between Pitt and Addington was exceedingly difficult, but
their reproaches and innuendoes made it impossible.[653]

The outcome was disastrous. The failure to form a strong and truly
national Administration ended all hope of peace. Over against Addington
set Bonaparte; with Hawkesbury compare Talleyrand; with Hobart,
Berthier.[654] The weighing need go no further. The British Ministry
kicks the beam; and in that signal inequali