ttle short of 6000 men; a force which, in
almost any other quarter of America, would have been
irresistible. Of the numbers of the enemy, again, various
reports were in circulation; some stating them at 20,000, others
at 30,000; but I believe that I come nearer the truth when I
suppose their whole force to have comprised 12,000 men of all
arms. It is, at least, certain that they exceeded us in numbers
as much as they did in resources; and that scarcely an hour
passed which did not bring in new levies to their camp.

The canal, as I have stated, being finished on the 6th, it was
resolved to lose no time in making use of it. Boats were
accordingly ordered up for the transportation of 1400 men; and
Colonel Thornton, with the 85th regiment, the marines, and a
party of sailors, was appointed to cross the river. But a number
of untoward accidents occurred, to spoil a plan of operations as
accurately laid down as any in the course of the war. The soil
through which the canal was dug being soft, part of the bank gave
way, and, choking up the channel, prevented the heaviest of the
boats from getting forward. These again blocked up the passage,
so that none of those which were behind could proceed; and thus,
instead of a flotilla for the accommodation of 1400 men, only a
number of boats sufficient to contain 350 was enabled to reach
their destination. Even these did not arrive at the time
appointed. According to the preconcerted plan, Colonel
Thornton's detachment was to cross the river immediately after
dark. They were to push forward, so as to carry all the
batteries, and point the guns before daylight; when, on the
throwing up of a rocket, they were to commence firing upon the
enemy's line, which at the same moment was to be attacked by the
main off our army.

In this manner was one part of the force to act, whilst the rest
thus appointed:--Dividing his troops into three columns, Sir
Edward directed that General Keane, at the head of the 95th, the
light companies of the 21st, 4th, and 44th, together with the two
black corps, should make a demonstration, or sham attack, upon
the right; that General Gibbs, with the 4th, 21st, 44th, and
93rd, should force the enemy's left, whilst General Lambert, with
the 7th and 43rd, remained in reserve, ready to act as
circumstances might require. But in storming an entrenched
position, something more than bare courage is required. Scaling
ladders and fascines had, therefore, b