feel that he
would be justified in risking the total loss of his army, which,
had the campaign been prolonged another fortnight, must under
such circumstances have taken place. That he erred in this
supposition is certain; but his was probably an error into which
most men similarly circumstanced would have fallen.

But the primary cause of all our disasters may be traced to a
source even more distant than any yet mentioned; I mean, to the
disclosure of our designs to the enemy. How this occurred I
shall not take it upon me to declare, though several rumours
bearing at least the guise of probability have been circulated.
The attack upon New Orleans was professedly a secret expedition;
so secret, indeed, that it was not communicated to the inferior
officers and soldiers in the armament till immediately previous
to our quitting Jamaica. To the Americans, however, it appears
to have been known long before; and hence it was that, instead of
taking them unawares, we found them fully prepared for our
reception. Nor is this all. It appears difficult to account for
the degree of negligence which affected the naval heads of the
present expedition, as far as the providing a competent number of
boats and small craft to transport the troops is concerned.
Throughout the whole fleet, barges enough to carry one-half of
the army could not be found; whereas there ought to have been a
sufficient quantity to contain not only the entire force, but all
its stores and ammunition. To this neglect, indeed, more perhaps
than to any other circumstances, is the failure of the attempt to
be attributed; since not a doubt can exist that, if General Keane
had been enabled to bring the whole of his army to land on the
morning of the 23rd, he would have reached New Orleans, without
firing a shot, before nightfall. But the opportunity is past, it
cannot be recalled, and therefore to point out errors on the part
of my countrymen can serve no good end. That the failure is to
be lamented no one will deny, since the conquest of New Orleans
would have proved beyond all comparison the most valuable
acquisition that could be made to the British dominions
throughout the whole western hemisphere. In possession of that
post we should have kept the entire southern trade of the United
States in check, and furnished means of commerce to our own
merchants of incalculable value.

The fact, however, is, that when we look back upon the whole
series of even