certain individuals among
themselves; and so great was the indignation expressed against
one corps, that the soldiers of other regiments would hardly
exchange words with those who chanced to wear that uniform.
Though deeply afflicted, therefore, we were by no means
disheartened, and even, yet anticipated, with an eagerness far
exceeding what was felt before, a renewal of the combat.

PREPARATIONS FOR RETREAT.

But General Lambert, on whom the chief command had devolved, very
prudently determined not to risk the safety of his army by
another attempt upon works evidently so much beyond their
strength. He considered, and considered justly, that his chances
of success were in every respect lessened by the late repulse.
In the first place, an extraordinary degree of confidence was
given to the enemy; in the next place, the only feasible plan of
attack having been already tried, they would be more on their
guard to prevent its being again put in execution; and lastly,
his own force was greatly diminished in numbers, whilst theirs
continued every day to increase. Besides, it would be casting
all upon the hazard of a die. If again defeated, nothing could
save our army from destruction, because unless it retreated in
force no retreat could be effected. A retreat, therefore, whilst
yet the measure appeared practicable, was resolved upon, and
towards that end were all our future operations directed.

To the accomplishment of this desirable object, however, one
great obstacle existed: by what road were the troops to travel,
and in what order were they to regain the fleet? On landing we
had taken advantage of the creek or bayo, and thus come up by
water within two miles of the cultivated country. But to adopt a
similar course in returning was impossible. In spite of our
losses there were not throughout the armament a sufficient number
of boats to transport above one-half of the army at a time. If,
however, we should separate, the chances were that both parties
would be destroyed; for those embarked might be intercepted, and
those left behind would be obliged to cope with the entire
American force. Besides, even granting that the Americans might
be repulsed, it would be impossible to take to our boats in their
presence, and thus at least one division, if not both, must be
sacrificed.

To obviate this difficulty prudence required that the road which
we had formed on landing should be continued to the very margin
of th