rwards
resisted and repelled all our efforts.

The second error evident in this business was the selection of
the schooner instead of the ship for destruction. Had the
latter, which lay farther up the stream been destroyed, the
former never could have passed our battery, nor been of further
annoyance to us; whereas, the schooner being burnt, the ship was
only removed out of the reach of danger, and posted where she
could be infinitely more advantageous to her friends and
detrimental to her enemies. This in itself was a grave error,
which beyond all doubt contributed, in some degree, to our
repulse on the 29th of December.

The third error, and one which continued to exert its influence
throughout the whole campaign, was the delay in bringing on a
general action. Why our troops fell back on the 29th I confess
is to me a mystery. It was not to be supposed that an officer
who had shown so much judgment as the American General, Jackson,
in his first endeavours to check our advance, would lose the
advantage which the nature of his position afforded. That he
would fortify the neck of land, indeed, was exactly what might
have been expected: and, therefore, every hour during which an
attack was deferred, contributed so much to his strength and to
our weakness. It is true that we should have suffered, and
perhaps suffered severely; but our chances of suffering were
certainly not diminished by delay. We ought, therefore, instead
of falling back, to have pursued our operations with vigour on
that day; because the American lines, being then incomplete,
would have assisted rather than retarded our progress.

It has been said, and perhaps truly, that the movement on the
29th was never intended for more than a reconnoissance: and
that the scheme subsequently adopted, of overpowering the enemy's
fire by a superior artillery brought from the fleet, was a wise
one. All this may be true; but as we did not succeed in silencing
the enemy's batteries, who, on the contrary, put ours to silence,
either the project was faulty in its design, or some grievous
error was committed in its execution. As far as our position was
affected by it, the results were these:--Three days more were lost
in making preparations, which ended in nothing; while, by the
enemy, these same days were judiciously and indefatigably
employed to improve their deficiency and recruit their force.

At last came the idea of digging a canal from the lakes to the