rrendered on the 17th. What now was to hinder General Bragg, holding
the strong position of Munfordsville, from stopping Buell, calling Kirby
Smith, with his whole force, to his assistance, and out-numbering, crush
his adversary? This question has been asked very often. How long would
the raw troops at Louisville have withstood the attack of Bragg's
veterans when their turn came? General Bragg discovered that the country
was barren of supplies--that one of the richest, most fertile regions of
Kentucky, could not support his army for a week, and he withdrew to
Bardstown. Buell finding the road clear, marched on to Louisville. His
immense wagon train, more than twenty miles long and the flank of his
army were exposed, and with impunity by this movement.

It was certainly not expecting too much of General Bragg, as
commander-in-chief of the Confederate forces in Kentucky, to expect that
he would (after this was done) make up his mind whether he was going to
fight or not, without farther delay. If he did not intend to fight,
would it not have been wiser to have marched back on Nashville, while
Buell was marching on Louisville, to have taken that place and to have
established himself on the banks of the Cumberland with less of loss,
fatigue, and discontent among his troops, than existed when after his
long, harassing, wearying marches through the mountains, he halted at
Murfreesboro' much later? Kirby Smith could have remained in Kentucky
long enough to collect and secure all the supplies--he had demonstrated
that he could take care of himself, and if he had been hard-pressed, he
could have retreated more rapidly than any pursuer could follow. If
General Bragg did intend to fight, why did he not concentrate his army
and fight hard?

After Buell marched to Louisville (which he reached on the 29th of
September), Bragg took position at and about Bardstown. Our line,
including General Smith's forces, may be described as running from
Bardstown, on the extreme left, through Frankfort and Lexington, to
Mount Sterling on the right flank. It was an admirable one. However
threatened on front or flanks, the troops could be marched to the
threatened points, by excellent roads. The base at Bryantsville was
perfectly secure--roads ran from it in every direction--and it was a
place of immense natural strength. The force available, for the defense
of this line, was quite forty-nine thousand infantry, General Bragg's
Staff officers represen