th, so that the army of Buell (or of Rosecrans it was
then), might not be in any too great haste to drive him away from
Murfreesboro', when it reached Nashville. General Bragg was limping on
so slowly, that it was by no means certain that a swinging march would
not put the enemy in possession of the whole of Middle Tennessee (with
scarcely a skirmish), and shut Bragg up in East Tennessee. With the
instinct, too, which he felt in common with all men who are born
generals, Breckinridge wished to press upon the enemy and strike him if
he discovered a vulnerable point.
He learned that a large lot of rolling-stock (of the Louisville and
Nashville Railroad), had been collected in Edgefield. There were,
perhaps, three hundred cars in all. If these were burned, the damage
done the enemy, and the delay occasioned him, would be very great. The
cars were collected at a locality commanded by the batteries on the
Capitol hill, and so near the river, that all the forces in the city
could be readily used to protect them. Breckinridge depended upon Morgan
to burn them, but planned a diversion on the south side of the river,
which he hoped would attract the enemy's attention strongly, and long
enough, to enable Morgan to do his work.
The day after we arrived at Gallatin, a dispatch was received from
General Breckinridge, communicating his plan. Forrest was to move on the
southeastern side of Nashville, supported by the Kentucky infantry
brigade, and Morgan was instructed to dash into Edgefield and burn the
cars, while Forrest was making all the racket he could. There was one
flaw in this plan, which no one perceived until all was over. Morgan
could not hope to succeed, unless, by moving all night, he got close
enough to Edgefield, to dash in early in the morning, before his
presence was even suspected. If he marched in the day time, or remained
after daylight in the vicinity of the place, his presence would
certainly be discovered, and preparations would be made to receive him.
But if he attacked at daylight, he scarcely allowed time for the troops
on the other side to commence their work, or at any rate, was likely to
attack simultaneously with them; when their attack, rousing every thing,
would, perhaps, do more harm than good. It so turned out.
Our brigade moved all night (of the 5th), and striking through the woods
came upon the northern side of Edgefield. Just as we struck the pickets,
we heard Forrest's guns on the other side
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